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The George Washington University
Objectives
Originally, I planned to focus on the beginning of the
intergovernmental processes after a major disaster was declared
in SC after Hurricane Hugo, in October 1989. It was not pos-
sible to get into the Charleston, SC area immediately after
the disaster and pursue that research plan for several reasons:
(a) the magnitude of the storm and wide-spread destruction lead
to massive, lengthy power outages; (b) tens of thousands of
persons were displaced from their homes and in need of food
and shelter; and (c) the public officials whom I would want to
interview would be too busy with operational needs to take time
to talk with me. Therefore, it did not make sense for a re-
searcher to go in right away and add to the burden in the
immediate aftermath.
On-site Situation
I was able to visit the Charleston County area five weeks
after Hurricane Hug~ hit. The revised objectives of my on-site
visit were to obtain information about the early planning for
recovery and about the efficiency and effectiveness of the
intergovernmental relations process as recovery planning got
underway. Going on-site five weeks after Hugo struck proved to
be good timing. The downtown Charleston area was recovered
enough for me to find lodgings and meals; and public officials
and citizens were willing to reflect about their experiences
of the last several weeks and to talk with me. I spent three
days on site.
Owing to the early reports by the media about delays in
starting the relief and recovery efforts and whose fault they
were, and to the fulminations of Senator Hollings who was quick
to call FEMA a "bunch of bureaucratic jackasses," it was espec-
ially difficult to find out what really was going on in the
Charleston ~ounty area.
Basic Facts and Figures
Hurricane Hugo hit SC on October 21-22. registering winds
up to 135 mph and spawning some tornadoes as well. While the
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eye of the storm passed over downtown Charleston, the brunt of
the damage was felt in the east and north of Charleston county.
The National Hurricane Center was able to give the SC area
significant advance warning. Evacuations were promptly ordered
and large numbers of persons were moved inland. Thanks to con-
siderable prior study, data, and computerized programs for
evacuation planning, the large scale evacuations help to min-
imize deaths and injuries from the hurricane.
In the aftermath of Hugo, the original Presidential
declaration was amended four times, and finally included 24
counties in SC. In addition, some counties in NC received a
declaration.
Estimates vary widely, but some basic working numbers are
as follows:
- damage caused by Hurricane Hugo to the
Atlantic Coast = $5 B.
- 9,000 homes destroyed
- 27,000 homes with major damage
- 20,500 applicants for temporary housing
- 292,000 unemployed persons in SC
The problems, issues and needs for the recovery phase are
enormous -- almost overwhelming. Psychologically, it is un-
fortunate that the San Francisco earthquake garnered all the
media attention, not to mention a huge federal appropriation
for recovery. I think the governmental officials and, of
course, the citizens of Charleston, would like to have remained
in the national spotlight and been the focal point for recovery
for a longer period of time.
While 24 or so counties in SC have received a declaration,
I focussed most of my attention on the Charleston county area,
which is a sizeable area containing 19 entities-- including
unincorporated areas.
Approach
I visited the Disaster Field Office, set up by FEMA, which
housed the key federal agency representatives, Red Cross and
other voluntary agencies, State Officials and leaders of the
Interagency hazard Mitigation Team. In addition, I met with
local officials and others in their offices and elsewhere. I
had formal interviews with about six persons and informally
talked to dozens more.
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Issues Worthy of Further Attention
There are many major issues and problems connected with
the local, State and federal governments' plans and actions in
terms of their response to and recovery from Hurricane Hugo.
In the initial trip report, prepared at the end of October, I
identified a number of issues that might be worthy of research.
Since then I have learned of several researchers who were in-
volved in Quick Response and/or other research efforts. As a
consequence of my Quick Response visit, I prepared a research
project proposal that focussed on the intergovernmental rela-
tions aspects of the recovery from Hurricane Hugo in SC.
Some of the issues I identified after my site visit are:
(a) Interaovernmenta1 Relations: federal, State, county
and local coordination. The evacuation process prior to the
Hurricane I s touchdown in SC was mainly a posi tive example.
Subsequently, interactions among the emergency management
personnel at each level of government involved generally did
not go well. The Declaration Process did not go smoothly. The
Governor and the Mayor of Charleston were cri tical of FEMA
early on the in the process of working together.
(b) State Emergency Management Capabi1i ty. The organi-
zational arrangement and capability of the state's emergency
services division and its relationships with the county emer-
gency management agencies should be examined. For reasons I do
not know, the Governor chose to by-pass this chain of command
and set up a parallel process from his office to local elected
officials to gain intelligence about the impact of the hurri-
cane.
The States abi1i ty (or inabi1i ty) to assess the damage
done and to perform the steps needed for a Presidential
declaration.
(b) City and County Emergency Management Capability.
Even within one county, Charleston County, there was a
wide range of local emergency management capability among the
19 entities in the county.
(c) Required Hazard Mitigation. FEMA's Sections 409 re-
quirements and the mitigation grant option under Section 404
provide the opportunity and the environment for doing natural
hazards mitigation. While the hurricane event will get primary
attention, will federal, State and local officials use this
required mitigation review process as an opportunity to press
for attention to seismic safety during the recovery period?
(d) Federal Hazard Mitigation Team. Role and functions of
the federal Interagency Hazard Mitigation team should be
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studied. There were some problems connected with the initial
mobilization and composition of the team. Not yet known are
the nature and quality of the team's recommendations. Worth
watching will be the extent of follow-through by all levels of
government involved in implementing the recommendations.
(e) Use of Hazard Mi tiqation Tools. Regarding hazard
mitigation, the relatively recent Sec.404 of FEMA's enabling
legislation created a program and earmarked funds for imple-
menting hazards mitigation measures. To what extent will this
program be used, and how effectively, in the aftermath of Hugo?
(f) Multi-Hazard Mitigation. A closely related question
is whether seismic safety consid~rations will be meshed with
flood mitigation in the conduct of the required sec. 409 hazard
mi tigation plan to be completed by the State and wi th the
optional use of Sec.404 program.
The IHMT 's role and report could serve as a catalyst for
increased local attention to and action regarding seismic
safety.
(g) Larqe Number of Displaced Persons. While I am not
sure of the exact numbers, perhaps as many as 50,000 persons
were displaced from their homes by Hugo. This disaster may
present the largest amount of residential destruction seen to
date by the U. S. disaster community. It raises interesting
questions about how to deal with large number of homeless
persons after a catastrophic earthquake. This should be
studied.
(h) The Political Setting. In the af~ermath of Hugo, FEMA
meet with a highly politically-charged environment in
Charleston area and at the state level. The local and Con-
gressional political figures and also the media seemed to do
a disservice to the FEMA efforts.
(i) Training, Education, and Preparedness. It appears that
recovery planning is not being adequately factored in to
emergency preparedness activities, not only in SC but in many
other states. Planning for recovery is either not being done
or is being done poorly. Why?
Recovery planning is not being taught or is not
being taught well;
- It is not being learned or understood; and/or
- It is not being applied at all or effectively
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A colleague involved in emergency preparedness training
for local officials commented that emergency managers focus
on the operational aspects of response and lack either the
interest or ability to do comprehensive, long-term recovery
planning.
The State of SC did not have any staffer invqlved in
hazard mitigation prior to Hugo. At the time of my visit the
staff official temporarily filling that job was an operations
person on loan to the DFO. Will the state create and fill the
position of State Hazard Mitigation officer in the post-
Hugo environment and what will be the results?
(j) Coastal Zone Manaaement. There are a host of issues
connected with coastal zone management and with the rebuild-
ing of coastal structures. I did not get into these issues
because I knew that other Quick Response Research and per-haps
the National Academy Reconnaissance Team had done so.
Additional Information Post-Visit
Managerial Deficiencies at FEMA. The organizational
problems at FEMA are compounded by the number of vacancies in
key politically-appointed positions. Ten months into the Bush
administration, virtually all major leadership positions are
vacant or are being help by holdover appointees from the last
administration. There is not one Bush administration appointee
in place at the agency. [Democratic Study Group Report.]
Crucial Timing. In SC, there is a window of opportunity
for improved emergency preparedness and emergency management.
In the wake of Hugo, a high degree of attention from each level
of government; the expectation of significant sums of public
assistance (as well as individual and family assistance) pay-
ments; the mandated requirements of the state's hazards miti-
gation plan ( Sec. 409 of FEMA's regulations) and the
availability of Sec 404. Hazard mitigation implementation
monies. Further, there have been significant seismic safety
planning activities on-going in the state, supported by Federal
money.
What changes, if any, will be made in the organization
arrangements for state and county emergency management? What
personnel changes, staffs increased, office locations changed
or efforts to increase the professionalism of emergency
management services?
Will the pressures to deal with seismic safety process
suceed? Will adoptio.n and implementation of state-wide seismic
safety building codes occur in the coming year?
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In the context of disaster preparedness activities, plan-
ning for recovery is either not being done or is being done
poorly. Why?
- Recovery planning is not being taught or is not
being taught well;
- It is not being learned or understood; and/or
- It is not being applied at all or effectively. possible
explanation is that emergency managers focus on the
operational aspects of response and lack either the
interest or ability to do comprehensive, long-term
recovery planning.]
Poor Recoverv Performance. The recent Hurricane Hugo was
catastrophic in terms of its wide-ranging destruction. Damage
to structures I lifelines and public property were the most
costly to date in the U. S. The hurricane impacted two U. S.
territories and two States seriously enough to warrant Presi-
dential disaster declarations.
About one week after Hugo hit the mainland U.S., the Lorna
Prieta earthquake occurred. While the federal government was
ready with a catastrophic earthquake plan, FEMA decided not to
trigger that plan. In terms of disaster response, both the
American Red Cross and the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) were seriously over-extended in terms of personnel and
financial resources and their abili ty to meet the 'needs of
victims stretched thin.
The Lorna Prieta Earthquake had two important effects on
the recovery efforts from Hurricane Hugo: (1) it made large
demands on federal dollars and personnel resources and (2) it
reminded people of the known vulnerability of the VI,PR and
coastal SC of their own vulnerability to earthquakes.
For researchers and practi tioners wi th many years of
disaster experience, it is painful to see how poorly, that
useful information based on research and experiential learning
is being taught and or retained by those responsible for
disaster management. Special attention will be paid to gaining
insight into why the education and training programs are being




News clippings on Hurricane Hugo in the Washington Post,
the New York Times, and the Charleston News and Courier,
and the Charleston Evening Post.
Special disaster issue of the Charleston Post-Courier,
includes s~mmary of disaster coverage from Sept. 22-26,
1989.
"In the Eye of the Storm: Is Government Prepared for
Disaster?" in Government Executive, December, 1989.
Interviews
FEMA Public Information Officers (2)
Red Cross/Private Vo1uhntary Organization Liaison
Federal Hazard. Mitigation Team Leader
State/Governors's Authorized Representative
Prof. Joyce Bagwell, Baptist College (phone)
Prof. Charles Lindbergh (phone)




FEMA, "Interagency Hazard Mitigation Team Report,"
Hurricane Hugo, FEMA 843-DR-SC, October 1989.
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